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Abstract
Mutation analysis is a technique used to evaluate the ad-
equacy of a test set with respect to a fault model. This ap-
proach is mainly used for unit testing evaluation. It is also
used to produce new test data.
In this paper, we apply mutation analysis in order to
evaluate the accuracy of a specification in the context of
reactive program verification by model-checking.
1 Introduction
A primary purpose for testing is to detect software fail-
ures so that defects may be uncovered and corrected. It im-
plies running the software item in predetermined conditions
(input selection), analyzing the obtained results, and identi-
fying errors [20]. Testing can never completely establish the
correctness of a program. For this reason, several methods
have been proposed to increase confidence with respect to
the test set provided, among which code coverage analysis
or mutation analysis. Code coverage describes the degree to
which the source code of a program has been tested. There
are a number of coverage criteria, among which statement
coverage, condition coverage, path coverage, def-use chains
coverage [15, 24, 22].
Mutation analysis has been introduced by DeMillo
in 1978 [6]. Its main purpose is to evaluate the qual-
ity/adequacy of a test set with respect to a fault model.
It is mainly used for unit testing evaluation. Since 1978,
mutation analysis has been widespread, improved and
evaluated. Is has been adapted for several programming
languages [5, 1, 19, 23]. Andrews et al. have demonstrated
that mutants can provide a good indication of the fault
detection ability of a test suite [2].
Mutation analysis has also been applied to evaluate
model-checking. To prove that a system satisfies a
property, a model-checker explores the state space of the
system, and check that a property is true in all the accessible
states. If it is not the case, a counter-example is provided.
The verification by model-checking is exhaustive in the
sense that all accessible states are explored. However, the
verification is limited by the properties to be checked: if
the property set does not cover all behaviors of the system,
some faults may remain. In order to evaluate how a set
of properties fully verifies a model, T.-C. Lee and P.-A.
Hsiung have proposed to use mutation analysis [17]. The
work have been carried out on timed automata. Six fault
models were used and six associated mutation scores
(called mutation coverage) were defined.
In the following, we focus on the validation of LUSTRE
programs by model-checking. LUSTRE is one of the syn-
chronous languages [13, 12]. During the last two decades,
the growing interest in synchronous languages from large
companies has initiated significant contributions to the prac-
tical validation problem of synchronous software [4].
Section 2 presents mutation analysis for test and il-
lustrate how mutation analysis can be used for model-
checking. Section 3 is dedicated to the presentation of LUS-
TRE language and illustrates the use of mutation-analysis in
the context of model-checking. In section 4, we analyze
some examples and discuss of the approach. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Mutation analysis
2.1 General principles for test set evalua-
tion
Mutation analysis consists in introducing a small syn-
tactic change in the source code of a program in order to
produce a mutant [6] (for instance, replacing one operator
by another or altering the value of a constant). Then the
mutant behavior is compared to the original program. If a
difference can be observed, then the mutant is marked as
killed. If the mutant has exactly the same observable behav-
ior as the original program, it is equivalent with respect to
the fault model.
The original aim of the mutation analysis is the evalua-
tion of a test set. To do that, one has to produce all mutants
corresponding to a predefined fault model. If the test set
can kill all non-equivalent mutants, the test set is declared
mutation-adequate. This means that the tests are able to
discriminate the behaviors of the faulty programs from the
original program.
Adequacy of the test set is evaluated thanks to the mu-
tation score (also called adequacy score). The mutation
score is the percentage of non-equivalent mutants that are
killed. A test set is mutation-adequate if the mutation score
is equals to one. Andrews et al. have demonstrated that
mutation analysis can provide a good indication of the fault
detection ability of a test suite [2].
Mutation analysis is usually used to evaluate the ade-
quacy of test set produced during unit testing. It has been
adapted for several programming languages such as ADA,
Java, C, VHDL, Petri-Nets, Final State Machine (FSM),
Statecharts, and Estelle [25, 5, 23, 18, 1, 21, 11, 7].
2.2 Using mutation for specification anal-
ysis
Classical mutation analysis compares the mutant outputs
to the original program outputs to decide if a mutant is killed
or not by a test set. This allows evaluating how the test-set
is good to detect small syntactical changes. When a specifi-
cation is available, it is also possible to compare the mutant
output to this specification in order to check that the speci-
fication is acute enough to detect the same types of faults.
In the case of model-checking, the specification is com-
posed of a set of properties. A model-checker verifies if the
properties hold in all accessible states of the program. But,
even if it is the case, some errors may remain: the properties
may not cover all the program. For instant, demonstrating
that the program satisfies the true property does not bring
useful feedback on the program correctness.
Using mutation analysis to evaluate how much a set of
properties covers the program was originally proposed by
T.-C. Lee and P.-A. Hsiung [17]. It was evaluated on timed
automata. Hereafter is a short presentation of this work.
When a mutant does not satisfy the specification, it is
said to be covered. The fraction of mutations detected by a
specification determines its completeness. Some coverage
metrics can be defined for the differents fault models. Its
value is computed by the ratio of the number of covered
mutations to the total number of non-equivalent mutations
obtained with the chosen fault model.
In [17], six fault models were used and six mutation cov-
erage metrics were deduced. Each fault model character-
izes a different aspect of a system state graph and identi-
fies different characteristic of the properties (expressed in
TCTL). The mutation fault models are (1) mutated initial
(concerns the initial state), (2) delayed transition (to delay a
mode transition), (3) shuttering mode (to add self-loop tran-
sition to a mode), (4) skipped mode (to make a non-initial
mode unreachable), (5) removed transition (deletes a transi-
tion from the state graphe), (6) mutated invariant (invariant
of mode is changed).
In the following, we are going to use the same vocab-
ulary than traditional mutation analysis. We will say that
a mutant is killed by the specification if the mutant does
not satisfy the specification (instead of covered). By exten-
sion, the mutation-score of a specification is the number of
non-equivalent mutants that does not satisfy the specifica-
tion (instead of coverage metric). Thus, if all mutants are
killed by the specification, we can say that the specification
is mutation-adequate.
3 LUSTRE program: validation and verifica-
tion
3.1 Brief presentation of LUSTRE language
LUSTRE [13, 12] is a synchronous declarative data flow
language. The synchronous hypothesis considers the pro-
gram reaction time to be negligible with respect to the reac-
tion time of its environment.
The synchronous data flow approach consists in present-
ing a temporal dimension into the data flow model. A flow
or stream (basic entity) includes two parts: a sequence of
values of a given type, and a clock representing a sequence
of instants (on the discrete temporal scale).
A LUSTRE description, structured in a network of nodes,
represents the relations between the inputs and the outputs
of a system. These relations are expressed by means of op-
erators (nodes or basic operators), of intermediate variables
and of constants.
A node is defined by a set of equations. Any local vari-
able or output must be defined by one and only one equa-
tion. The equations can be written in any order without
changing the behaviors of the program.
LUSTRE offers usual arithmetic, boolean and conditional
operators and two specific operators: pre, the “previous”
operator, and −> the followed-by operator1. Fig. 1
gives a LUSTRE program implementing a simple stopwatch
1Let E and F be two expressions of the same type denoting the se-
quences (e0, e1, ..., en...) and (f0, f1, ..., fn, ...); pre(E) denotes the se-
quence (nil, e0, e1, ..., en−1...) where nil is an undefined value. E−> F
denotes the sequence (e0, f1, ..., fn...).
node chrono (raz : bool)
returns (n : int);
let
n = 0 -> if raz then 0 else (pre(n)+1);
tel;
Figure 1. A simple LUSTRE program
(chronometer). The output n is set to 0 at the first step or
when the raz input is true. It is incremented by one other-
wise: the value of n at the current top is equal to the value of
n at the previous top (pre n) plus one. The current and
when operators are two other temporal specific operators of
LUSTRE used for sampling signals.
An execution trace of a LUSTRE node is a sequence of in-
put and output values. An execution trace is given Fig 2 for
chrono node. When output values depend on current and
previous inputs, the node is sequential. It deals with tempo-
ral operators. Otherwise, it is combinatorial. chrono is a
sequential node.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
raz 0 0 0 1 1 0
n 0 1 2 0 0 1
Figure 2. An execution trace for chrono
3.2 Running Example: a temperature
control system
Let us consider the following example of a temperature
control system given in [3]. This system is composed of
one heater, one air conditioner, some temperature sensors
and one ON/OFF switch. The program has four inputs:
• Running is a signal active when the ON/OFF switch of
the device is to the ON position.
• BelowDesiredTemp, TempOk and AboveDesiredTemp
are signals issued by the temperature sensors. They
are active when the current temperature is respectively
lower, equal or higher than the desired temperature.
The program has four outputs, which are mutually exclu-
sive signals. They set the current mode of the system:
• OFF, meaning that the system is turned off.
• INACTIVE, meaning that the system is on but neither
the heater nor the air conditioner is on.
• HEAT and AC, meaning that either the heater or the
air conditioner, respectively, is on and controlling the
temperature.
The assumption made here on the environment is that
exactly one of the three inputs BelowDesiredTemp, TempOK
and AboveDesiredTemp is true at the same time. Another
one is that the temperature cannot raise (resp. fall) from a
value below (resp. above) the desired temperature to a value
above (resp. below) it without reaching in the meantime the
desired temperature.
It is possible to express the environment assertions and
the expected safety properties of a system in LUSTRE, since
it is also considered a temporal logic of the past. For the en-
vironment properties, the two assertions can be formalized
as
1. (AboveDesiredTemp or BelowDesiredTemp or Tem-
pOK) and #(AboveDesiredTemp, BelowDesiredTemp,
TempOK)
2. once from to(TempOK, BelowDesiredTemp,
Above- DesiredTemp) and once from to(TempOK,
AboveDesiredTemp, BelowDesiredTemp)
where # is a built-in logical operator ensuring that no
more than one of the boolean expressions in its argument
list is true at the same time. once from to(A,B,C)
is a user-defined temporal operator returning a true
value when the event A has occurred at least once be-
tween two subsequent occurrences of B and C. Similarly
always from to(A,B,C) returns a true value when the
event A continuously occurs between two subsequent oc-
currences of B and C. The definition of such temporal oper-
ators in LUSTRE can be found in [14]. A LUSTRE program
for controlling that system is presented in [16] and illus-
trated Fig 3.
3.3 Lesar, a model-checker for Lustre
LESAR is a model-checker for LUSTRE. Given a pro-
gram P and a safety property S, LESAR checks that S is
true in all states of the program P under some assumptions
(expressed by an assertion A). The problem thus reduces to
proving that the only boolean output of P is always true dur-
ing any execution of the program which permanently satis-
fies the assertion A. The verification is performed on a finite
state abstraction of the program. Any numerical compu-
tation is deliberately ignored, and boolean expressions de-
pending on numerical variables (e.g., comparisons) are con-
sidered nondeterministic.
LESAR takes a verification program as input (see Fig.
4). It is written in LUSTRE. It has the same inputs than the
original program and only one boolean output. This output
is equal to the safety property to be proved. The assert oper-
ator allows to restrict the verification to the inputs satisfying
the environment constraints.
For instance, for the temperature control system, one can
express the following safety properties:
node Clim(Running, BelowDesiredTemp, TempOk, AboveDesiredTemp: bool)
returns (OFF, INACTIVE, HEAT, AC : bool);
let
OFF = not Running;
INACTIVE = Running and TempOk;
HEAT = (Running and BelowDesiredTemp) ->
(pre (OFF or INACTIVE or HEAT) and Running and BelowDesiredTemp);
AC = (Running and AboveDesiredTemp) ->
(pre (OFF or INACTIVE or AC) and Running and AboveDesiredTemp);
tel
Figure 3. A temperature control system in LUSTRE
node VP(Running, BelowDesiredTemp, TempOk, AboveDesiredTemp: bool)
returns (res: bool);
var OFF, INACTIVE, HEAT, AC : bool;
let
-- environment constraints
assert ((AboveDesiredTemp or AboveDesiredTemp or TempOk) and
#(AboveDesiredTemp,AboveDesiredTemp,TempOk) );
assert (once_from_to(TempOK,BelowDesiredTemp,AboveDesiredTemp) and
once_from_to(TempOK,AboveDesiredTemp,BelowDesiredTemp));
-- program to be verified
(OFF, INACTIVE, HEAT, AC) =
Clim(Running, BelowDesiredTemp, TempOk, AboveDesiredTemp);
-- safety properties
res = implies(OFF, not Runnning) and
implies(INACTIVE, Runnning and TempOk) and
implies(OFF, Runnning and BelowDesiredTemp) and
implies(OFF, Runnning and AboveDesiredTemp);
tel
Figure 4. A verification program for the temperature control system
• The system is off only when the appliance is off.
implies(OFF, not Runnning)
• The system is inactive only if the appliance is on
and if the current temperature is equal to the desired
temperature.
implies(INACTIVE, Runnning and
TempOk)
• The system is heating only if the appliance is on and
if the current temperature is below than the desired
temperature.
implies(OFF, Runnning and
BelowDesiredTemp)
• The system is cooling only if the appliance is on and
if the current temperature is lower than the desired
temperature.
implies(OFF, Runnning and
AboveDesiredTemp)
LESAR can prove that the program Clim satisfies the
given properties, in less than a second. But it is difficult to
determine if the properties describes all the program behav-
iors or only a part of them.
3.4 Mutation analysis for LUSTRE
Alien-V2 is a tool we built for mutating LUSTRE nodes
[8]. This tool was produced within collaboration between
LSR (team VASCO) and LCIS (team VALSYS). The multi-
language mutant generator for VHDL and C developed by
LCIS (Alien) [21] was extended to LUSTRE.
Alien-V has a mutation operator table as input. It is pos-
sible to adapt it to define specific mutation operators. Arith-
metic/Logical/Relational Operator Replacement are defined
by default. CSR (Constant for Scalar variable Replace-
ment) and SCR (Scalar for Constant Replacement) have to
2Lustre also means “5 years long” in French.
be manually parameterized for each program.
LESAR can be used to detect equivalent mutants pro-
duced for a LUSTRE program. The verification program
should carry out the comparison of the mutant and origi-
nal program. When some environment assertions are pro-
vided with the original program, it is possible to consider
the mutant-equivalency with respect to the environment de-
scription (using the assert operator) or without consider-
ing environment (unconditional equivalence).
For the program Clim, Alien-V produces 193 mutants.
Clim uses 8 boolean variables (input or output). There are
17 “instances” of these variables inside the program where
a changed can be done3. Each of them can be replaced by
the 7 other variables, the true value, the false value and
the negation of the variable (170 mutants). There are also
11 instances of a logical operator, which can be replaced by
two other operators (22 mutants). Among those 193 mu-
tants, 12 of them are syntactically incorrect. 4 mutants are
equivalent without considering environment (unconditional
equivalence) and 18 of them are equivalent with respect to
the environment description.
As presented previously, the Clim specification is com-
posed of 4 safety properties. Clim satisfies those proper-
ties under the environment constraints. We use the LESAR
model-checker in order to check if the 163 non-equivalent
mutants satisfy or not those properties. The verification
program proposed Fig. 4 was used with the mutated im-
plementations of Clim. 86 non-equivalent mutants satisfy
the 4 safety properties under the environment constraints.
This means that those mutants were not killed by the spec-
ification. The mutation score of the specification is thus
86/163=0.52.
In fact, the specification provided for the temperature
control system is composed two other properties: if the ap-
pliance is on, as soon as the current temperature goes below
(resp. above) the expected temperature, the system will start
heating (resp. cooling). These properties are expressed in
LUSTRE with respect to the previous step.
• implies(pre (Runnning and
BelowDesiredTemp),HEAT)
• implies(pre (Runnning and
AboveDesiredTemp), AC or pre AC)
If the mutation analysis is carried out against the com-
plete specification, we obtain that all mutants are killed
(they do not satisfy the properties). The mutation score of
the complete specification is thus 1.
3A mutation of the variables on the left side of the equal signe is not
done since it produce syntaxtical incorrect programs.
4 Case studies and discussion
4.1 Case studies
We have applied this approach on three examples: a sub-
way U-turn section (UMS) [14], a water supplying system
(Supplying) [10], a mouse controller (Mouse) [9]. The re-
sults are detailed hereafter and a summary is presented ta-
bles 1 and 2. For this 3 simple programs, the specification
mutation score is low (below 0.5).
The Mouse program is an interface between a 3-button
device and an application program. It transforms “physical
clicks” on a mouse into “logical clicks” usable by the appli-
cation program. A physical click corresponds to the action
of clicking one button. A logical click is defined by a cou-
ple of values. A logical click is simple, double or triple. A
triple click can occur only during a specified time lap. A
triple click results from three clicks on the same button in a
row in less than T ticks. A double (resp. simple) click is ob-
tained when the same button is pressed twice (resp. once)
in a row in less than T ticks. A triple click has a priority
over simple and double clicks. A double click has a priority
over a simple click.
The inputs of the conversion program are the button
numbers. The outputs of the conversion program are cou-
ples of values the click type and the button number. Three
safety properties were expressed, stating that (1) a logical
click can only be simple, double or triple. (2) a logical click
correspond to only one button number and (3) a type of log-
ical clic is always associated to a button number (and re-
spectively). The environment assertions state only that it is
not possible to press two (physical) buttons simultaneously.
The property set is incomplete since the time lap is not
specified. Moreover, the output values are not specified with
respect to the input ones. The reason why is that Lesar carry
out an abstraction an integer value is used to compute the
time elapsed between a physical and the associated logical
click. It then provides “false” counter-examples due to this
abstraction for any properties dealing with the computation
of the time lap. This has been confirmed by the mutation
analysis. 492 mutants were produced with ALien-V, among
which 478 are not equivalent. Only 214 are killed by the
properties, which represents a mutation score of 0.44.
The UMS program controls the U-turn section of a sub-
way. A U-turn section allows trains to switch from one track
to the other, and to go back in the opposite direction. A
U-turn section is composed of three tracks A, B, C, and a
switch S. Assuming the entering track is A and the exiting
track is C, trains switching from A to C must first wait for
S to connect A with B, then transit on B and wait again for
S to connect B with C before going back on C.
node oracle_ps( on_A, on_B, on_C,
ack_AB, ack_BC: bool)
returns (res : bool);
var
-- UMS outputs
grant_access, grant_exit, do_AB, do_BC: bool;
-- for safety property
no_collision, exclusive_req : bool;
no_derail_AB, no_derail_BC : bool;
-- for intermediate computations
empty_section, only_on_B : bool ;
let
-- assertions
assert not(ack_AB and ack_BC);
assert always_from_to (ack_AB, ack_AB,do_BC);
assert always_from_to (ack_BC, ack_BC,do_AB);
assert empty_section -> true;
assert true -> implies(edge(not empty_section),
pre grant_access);
assert true -> implies(edge(on_C),
pre grant_exit);
assert true -> implies(edge (not on_A), on_B);
assert true -> implies(edge(not on_B),
on_A or on_C);
-- UMS equations
grant_access = empty_section and ack_AB;
grant_exit = only_on_B and ack_BC;
do_AB = not ack_AB and empty_section;
do_BC = not ack_BC and only_on_B;
empty_section = not(on_A or on_B or on_C);
only_on_B = on_B and not(on_A or on_C);
-- Safety properties
no_collision = implies(grant_access,
empty_section);
exclusive_req = not(do_AB and do_BC);
no_derail_AB = always_from_to(ack_AB,
grant_access,only_on_B);
no_derail_BC = always_from_to(ack_BC,
grant_exit,empty_section);
res = no_collision and
exclusive_req and
no_derail_AB and
no_derail_BC ;
tel
Figure 5. The U-turn system: assertions,
code and safety properties together
The UMS Lustre program has 5 inputs and 4 outputs.
It is a combinatorial node, composed of 6 equations. The
specification is composed of 4 safety properties and 8 en-
vironment assertions. The code of the verification program
is preproduced Fig. 5. Alien-V produces 174 syntactically
correct mutants. 171 of them are not-equivalent (under the
environment assertions). Among these, 80 are killed by the
properties under the environment assertions. This means
that the mutation score is 0.46.
This result may appear surprising: the program is very
simple, the environment assertions are quite restrictive and
all outputs are expressed in the properties. However, prop-
erties mostly state what should not be done (specification of
some incorrect outputs) but do not specify what should be
done (specification of the required behavior). For instance,
a system that does “nothing” is safe. That is the case for
60 mutants that have at least one output always false and
satisfy the properties. In this case, the property have been
chosen to allow implementation freedom.
The water supplying system The water supplying sys-
tem is composed of a artesian well, a tank, and two pumps.
The second pump is used to distribute water in the build-
ing. It is started when at least one tap is turned on. It is
stopped when all taps are turned off. The first pump is used
to fill the tank when the water level in the tank is too low.
Both pumps are equipped with temperature sensor. If a rise
in temperature is observed, pump should be stopped. An
information board, inside the building, is composed of 4
warming lamps. A green lamp indicates that the system is
OK. Two red lamps indicate if the first or the second pump
are off. A last red lamp indicates if the tank low level is
reached.
The system has to control the pumps and the information
broad. Its inputs consist of 9 booleans: the 3 levels of the
tanks, the temperature sensors of the two pumps the manual
commands for re-activation the sensor to detect dry pump-
ing and an input indicates if one tap is open. The outputs
consist of 6 booleans: the commands for the 2 pumps and
the 4 lights. There are 4 environment assertions indicating
the initial state of the pump and the evolution of the water
level. 4 safety properties were defined.
Alien-V produces 285 mutants syntactically correct. 226
mutants were not equivalent. Among these, only 52 kill the
specification (the mutation score is 0.23). Two situations
can be observed. First, some parts of the system are not
specified. For instance, 60 non-equivalent mutants deal with
the values of the 4 lights. None of them are killed since
the safety properties are not concerned by the values of the
light. Second, some parts of the system (the control of the
pumps) are specified as it is done for the U-Turn: incorrect
behaviors are specified but not the correct ones. Here again,
this choice was done to allow implementation freedom.
Program # node # input # output # env. # safety
Conditioner 1 4 4 4 6
UMS 1 5 4 8 4
Supplying 8 9 6 4 4
Mouse 1 3 6 1 3
Table 1. Quantitative elements about the pro-
grams
Program Conditioner UMS Mouse Supplying
# mutants 181 174 492 285
# eqv (under
env. assertions) 18 3 14 59
# killed 163 80 214 52
Score 1 0.46 0.44 0.23
Table 2. Quantitative elements about the mu-
tants
4.2 Discussions
The application of the approach proposed by [17] on
these 4 examples help us to identify some elements miss-
ing in the different specifications. Several types of situa-
tions were observed. Some properties were not described,
because
1. they were simply forgotten (possibly for the demon-
stration purposes),
2. they concerned outputs that were judged to be non-
critical,
3. they are not provable by the model-checker (here, they
concerned liveness and abstraction on the integers),
4. some implementation freedom was left.
In order to detect situations such as the first one, it is
interesting to apply mutation analysis. Admittedly, it is ex-
pensive but it provides a real feedback.
About the second point, not specifying non-critical out-
puts is often done on purpose. If it is the case, one may want
to drop mutation analysis for those parts. In order to do that,
we would like to couple mutation analysis with a ”slicing”
approach. The idea would be to extract only critical parts
(here equations) of the application out of the total code and
restrict the mutation analysis on these parts. Typically, for
the Supplying example, the critical parts deal with the con-
trol of the pumps. Being able to provide mutations on the
associated equations would result to study less mutants (3/4
in this case).
For the third point, if properties that can not be proved
are required, test can be applied. The mutation analysis can
thus be applied at two steps. It will first help to identify the
lacks of the specification. It will then help to evaluate the
relevance of the test data. The advantage here is that the
same mutants are used.
Finally, for the fourth point, when the specification al-
lows some implementation freedom, the mutation analysis
will provide possibly a low mutation score. The user may
try to increase the mutation score by completing the spec-
ification in a wrong way, for instance, by duplicating the
code. This could have been done for the U-Turn example,
since the code is very “simple”.
5 Conclusion and perspectives
Mutation analysis has been proposed to evaluate the ad-
equacy of a test set with respect to a fault model. It has
been proposed also to evaluate how much a specification
“covers” a program in the context of verification by model-
checking. The original work concerned timed automata
specified in TCTL. Here, we have applied the same idea
for Lustre programs. We have studied 4 programs and their
specification published in the litterature. The specifications
are safety properties also expressed in LUSTRE (which can
be considered as a temporal logic of the past) and proved
with the LESAR model-checker.
This work allows us to drive the following conclusion.
Yes, mutation analysis help to discover some lack in the
specification: for three of the studied programs the muta-
tion score of the specification is very low, due to missing
properties. But, safety properties are sometime introduced
with the idea to let some implementation freedom (several
implementations can be accepted). In this situation, mu-
tation score should be used carefully. It could be easy to
add properties that are a copy of the code, just to increase
the mutation score. Such a practice would improve super-
ficially the confidence within the software, without improv-
ing its quality.
Our perspective of this work is to couple the mutation
analysis with a slicing approach, in order to restrict the anal-
ysis only on parts that are concerned with the properties.
This would decrease the cost of the mutation analysis (by
reducing the time spent in the analysis) and provide a more
precise verdict about the specification relevance. More-
over, it will reduce the risk to artificially over-specified non-
critical parts.
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